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attempts	 in	 Indonesia	 with	 the	 Komisi	 Pemberantasan	 Korupsi	 (KPK),	 The	 Corruption	




Commission	 was	 formed	 as	 a	 specialized	 institution	 to	 tackle	 chronic	 corruption	 issues	















Indonesian	 political	 shift	 since	
1998	does	not	only	yield	positive	results,	
but	also	undesired	consequences.	Those	
intended	 results	of	 the	 shift	 include	 the	
term	 limits	 of	 president's	 powers	
(Crouch	2010),	reformation	in	the	army	
roles	 (Honna	 2003;	 Mietzner	 2009),	
administration	 and	 regional	 autonomy	
reformation	(Baswedan	2007),	and	many	
more.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	undesired	
consequences	 include	 high-cost	 politics	
(Wibowo	2013),	party	 cartels	 (Ambardi	
2008),	 political	 dynasties	 (Agustino	
2010;	 Kenawas	 2013),	 and	 ever	
strangling	 corruption	 up	 to	 the	 grass-
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occurred	 long	 before	 that	 (Juwono	
2016).	 This	 article	 focuses	 on	 the	
discussion	 of	 corruption	 in	 the	
Indonesian	 Reformation	 era	 (up	 to	 the	
era	of	President	Joko	Widodo).	One	that	
is	very	worrying	about	corruption	cases	
in	 Indonesia,	 according	 to	Agustino	dan	
Fitriani	 (2017),	 is	 the	 spread	 of	
corruption	 starting	 from	 the	 central	
government	level	to	the	regional	level	(it	
even	 occurs	 at	 the	 village	 level).	 In	 the	
past,	 the	 Indonesian	 people	 never	
thought	 that	 corruption	would	 occur	 in	
areas	 considered	 taboo,	 such	 as	 in	 the	
religious,	 education	 and	 health	 sectors.	
But	now,	it	is	precisely	in	these	areas	that	
the	 epicenter	 of	 corruption	 occurs.	 The	
question	now,	how	 is	 the	eradication	of	
corruption	in	Indonesia?	What	is	the	role	
of	 the	 Corruption	 Eradication	
Commission	 (Komisi	 Pemberantasan	
Korupsi,	 KPK)	 so	 far?	 Is	 there	 any	
resistance	against	the	KPK	in	combating	




The	 issue	 of	 corruption	 is	 not	 a	
central	 issue	 that	was	widely	 discussed	
by	scholars	 in	the	 last	 five	decades.	The	
reason	is	that	the	focus	of	the	era	was	on	
the	 issue	 of	 security	 and	 competition	
between	 the	 two	major	 blocs	 (between	
the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 West	 and	 the	
Soviet	Union	in	the	East).	However,	after	
the	Cold	War	era,	the	issue	of	corruption	
began	 to	be	part	of	 scientific	debates	 in	





classic	 book	 explains	 that	 bribery	 or	
corruption	will	 not	produce	 an	efficient	
bureaucracy	 as	 Huntington	 (1968)	 had	
written	decades	earlier.	Leff	(1964)	once	
wrote	 that	 corruption	 can	 be	 used	 to	
improve	 welfare.	 But	 now,	 referring	 to	
Gupta	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 for	 example	 -	 who	
supports	 Rose-Ackerman's	 (1999)	
argument	 -	 explains	 that	 in	 countries	
with	high	levels	of	corruption,	health	and	
education	 services	 are	 running	
ineffectively	and	inefficiently.	
Although	 the	 issue	 of	 corruption	
is	the	center	of	attention	of	scholars	until	





office	 or	 authority	 for	 private	 benefit	—	
through	 bribery,	 extortion,	 influence	
peddling,	nepotism,	fraud,	speed	money	or	
embezzlement.”	 Rose-Ackerman	 (2008)	
defines	 corruption	 into	 two	 categories:	
(i)	 small	 corruption	 and	 (ii)	 big	
corruption.		
Minor	 corruption	 leads	 to	
exclusive	and	unfair	profit	sharing	and	to	
officials'	 efforts	 to	 complicate	 the	
bureaucracy.	 While	 major	 corruption	
causes	 state	 failure	 because	 it	 may	 be	
that	 certain	 sectors	 of	 government	
function	 as	 “bribery	 machines”	 (Rose-
Ackerman	2008:	331).	But	the	definition	
of	 Rose-Ackerman	 (2008)	 is	 too	 broad	
and	complicated	to	be	used	as	a	foothold	
in	 discussing	 corruption	 as	 a	
multidimensional	 problem	 (political,	










Jakob	 (2005)	 defines	 corruption	 as	 an	
abuse	 of	 public	 power	 for	 personal	 or	
private	interests	which	harms	the	public	
in	 ways	 that	 are	 contrary	 to	 applicable	
legal	 provisions.	 This	 definition	 is	 quite	
helpful	 in	 limiting	 the	 discussion	 about	
corruption,	 but	 the	 weakness	 of	 this	
definition	 lies	 in	 the	 bias	 that	 tends	 to	
discredit	 the	 public	 sector,	 as	well	 as	 a	
definition	 that	 does	 not	 cover	 acts	 of	
corruption	 by	 the	 private	 party	 even	
though	 it	 is	 equally	 detrimental	 to	 the	
public.	
So	how	to	deal	with	the	problem	
of	 corruption	 in	 Indonesia	 before	 the	
Reformation	era?	Not	an	easy	question	to	
answer.	According	to	several	sources,	at	
least	 the	 illustration	 is	 as	 follows.	
Corruption	 is	 not	 a	 new	 problem	 in	
Indonesia.	It	is	inherited	since	the	era	of	
kingdoms	 (Carey	 2017).	 Then,	 it	 is	
continued	during	 the	Dutch	 occupation.	
Back	 then,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 18th	
Century,	 the	 VOC	 (Vereenigde	
Oostindische	 Compagnie,	 the	 Dutch	 East	
India	 Company)	 went	 bankrupt	 due	 to	
the	 rampant	 corruption	 in	 its	 body	
(Margana	2009).	After	the	proclamation	
of	 independence,	 many	 Dutch	 officials	
returned	 to	 their	 homeland,	 and	 the	
vacant	 positions	 were	 then	 filled	 by	
native	 formerly	 worked	 for	 the	 Dutch	
(ambtenaar)	 who	 grew	 up	 in	 a	 corrupt	
environment.	 It	 is	 this	 corrupt	 culture	
that	 continues	 in	 post-independence	
Indonesia.	 Nevertheless,	 according	 to	
King	(2000),	corruption	at	the	beginning	
of	 independence	 barely	 existed.	 This	 is	
the	 implication	 of	 the	 idealism	 of	 the	
nation’s	 founders,	 including	 their	
political	 elites.	 But	 when	 Sukarno	
imposed	 Demokrasi	 Terpimpin	 (the	
Guided	Democracy)	 in	 1959,	Demokrasi	
Parlementer	 (the	 Parliamentary	
Democracy)	 system	 was	 dissolved,	 the	
press	was	restrained,	foreign	companies	
were	nationalized,	and	monopolies	were	
created,	 then	 opportunities	 for	 rent-
seeking	 (King	 2000:	 607)	 were	 wide	
opened.	 Mackie	 (1970)	 explained	 that	
corruption	 became	 endemic	 under	
Guided	 Democracy	 when	 financial	
accountability	almost	 collapsed	because	
of	 ugly	 administrative	 management	 in	
the	 era	 of	 Sukarno’s	 leadership.	
Unfortunately,	 this	 weakness	 was	 not	
corrected	during	the	Suharto	New	Order	
era.	 By	 using	 his	 power,	 Suharto	
participated	 and	 “was	 enjoying”	 bribes,	
gratuities,	 and	 other	 unlawful	 personal	
benefits	 (Robison	 1986;	 Winters	 2011;	
Juwono	2016).	The	inability	of	Soeharto’s	
New	 Order	 regime	 to	 deal	 with	 the	




in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 corruption	 became	
commonplace	in	decision	making	and	its	
implementation	 in	 the	 Soeharto	 New	
Order	era	(Liddle	1996:	88).	
Does	 this	 show	 that	 the	 New	
Order	 does	 not	 care	 about	 corruption?	
Not	really.	Because	from	an	institutional	
perspective,	 there	 had	 been	many	 anti-
corruption	 institutions	 formed	 by	
Soeharto.	In	1968,	based	on	Presidential	
Decree	 Number	 228	 of	 1967,	 President	
Soeharto	 formed	 a	 team	 aimed	 at	
eradicating	 corruption	 (Agustino	 and	
Fitriani	2017:	5).	This	team	is	called	the	
Tim	 Pemberantasan	 Korupsi	 (TPK,	 the	
Corruption	 Eradication	 Team).	 Shortly	
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Soeharto	 strengthened	 efforts	 to	
eradicate	 corruption	 by	 forming	 a	 the	
Komisi	4	(the	Commission	4)	whose	main	
tasks	were:	 (i)	 conducting	 research	and	
evaluating	 the	 policies	 and	 results	
achieved	 in	 eradicating	 corruption	 and	
(ii)	 considering	 the	 Government	
regarding	policies	that	were	still	needed	
in	 combating	 corruption	 (Agustino	 and	
Fitriani	 2017:	 6).	 Based	 on	 these	
authorities,	Komisi	4	moves	to	eradicate	
corruption	in	the	Ministry	of	Religion,	the	
Agency	 for	 Logistics	 (Badan	 Urusan	
Logistik,	 Bulog),	 Telkom	 (the	 state-
owned	 telecommunication	 enterprise),	
and	 Pertamina	 (Perusahaan	 Tambang	
dan	 Minyak	 Negara,	 the	 state-owned	
mining	 and	 oil	 company)	which	 at	 that	
time	 were	 considered	 as	 the	 most	
corrupt	 government	 institutions.	
However,	the	results	and	findings	of	the	
studies	 by	 the	 commission	 in	 the	 field	
were	 never	 heeded	 by	 the	 government.	
In	 the	 end,	 the	 Soeharto’s	 New	 Order	
regime	 was	 uprooted	 by	 the	 people	
power	movement	that	demanded,	among	











Korupsi,	 KPK)	 is	 a	 State	 Institution	




two	 years.	Due	 to	 this	 time	 constraints,	
the	government	at	that	time	sent	several	
top	 leaders	 in	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Law	 and	
Human	Rights	(Kementerian	Hukum	dan	
Hak	 Asasi	 Manusia,	 KemenkumHAM)	 to	
conduct	a	comparative	study	to	the	Hong	
Kong	 Independent	 Commission	 Against	
Corruption	(ICAC)	in	Hong	Kong	(Juwono	
2016:	 228).	 Not	 only	 the	 ICAC,	 but	 the	
KPK	also	conducted	correspondence	(to	
strengthen	 its	 role	 and	 function)	 with	
anti-bribery	 institutions	 from	 many	
countries,	 such	 as	 the	 Malaysian	 Anti-
Corruption	 Commission	 (MACC),	 the	
Brunei	 Anti-Corruption	 Bureau	 (ACB),	
the	 Thai	 National	 Counter	 Corruption	
Commission	 (NCCC),	 the	 Philippine	
Ombudsman,	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	
Independent	 Commission	 Against	
Corruption	 (ICAC),	 and	 the	 Singapore	
Corrupt	 Practices	 Investigation	 Bureau	
(CPIB).	 Despite	 learning	 a	 lot	 from	 the	
ICAC	 and	 other	 anti-corruption	
organizations,	 the	 KPK	 did	 not	 fully	
replicate	 the	 ICAC,	 which	 only	 handles	
investigations	 on	 corruption	 cases.	
Rather,	 the	 KPK	 handles	 investigations	
and	 prosecutions	 of	 corruption	 cases,	
and	it	is	even	granted	authority	to	search,	




authorities	 of	 the	 KPK’s	 triggered	most	
parties	 in	 the	 House	 rejected	 the	
formation	of	this	commission	(Tempo	24-
30	December	2012:	74).	As	a	result,	 the	
International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	
“forced”	 the	 Indonesian	 government	 to	
establish	 the	 KPK;	 otherwise,	 foreign	
assistance	 loan	 from	the	 IMF	would	not	
be	 disbursed	 (Kuris	 2012:	 5).	 The	
“coercion”	from	the	IMF	appeared	in	the	









Letter	 of	 Intent	 (LoI)	 signed	 by	 the	
Indonesian	government	with	the	IMF,	in	
which	 the	 LoI	 stated	 that	 the	
disbursement	 of	 the	 loan	 to	 Indonesia	
would	 be	 carried	 out	 after	 the	 KPK’s	




passing	 of	 Law	 Number	 30	 of	 2002	
concerning	 the	 Corruption	 Eradication	





been	 carried	 out	 optimally	 and	 the	
government	 institutions	 that	 handle	
corruption	 cases	 had	 not	 functioned	
effectively	 and	 efficiently.	 	 There,	
corruption	was	mentioned	as	a	crime	or	
a	 violation	 of	 the	 social	 and	 economic	
rights	 of	 the	 people	 and	 it	 brought	
disasters	 to	 the	 national	 economy	 and	
also	 to	 the	 life	 of	 the	 nation.	 For	 this	
reason,	 corruption	 could	 no	 longer	 be	
classified	 as	 an	 ordinary	 crime,	 but	
rather	 an	 “extraordinary”	 crime,	 so	 its	
eradication	also	had	to	be	carried	out	in	
“extraordinary”	 ways.	 With	 the	
establishment	 of	 an	 independent	 KPK	
with	 its	broad	authorities,	 it	was	hoped	
that	 corruption	 eradication	 could	 be	
carried	 out	 systematically,	 effectively,	
and	 maximally.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 the	
tasks	of	the	KPK	(as	stipulated	in	Article	
6	 of	 Law	 No.	 30	 of	 2002),	 include	
coordination	 and	 supervision,	
investigation,	 investigation,	 and	
prosecution	 of	 criminal	 acts	 of	
corruption,	and	also	the	prevention	and	
monitoring	 of	 governance	 in	 the	
eradication	of	corruption.	
In	 addition,	 the	 KPK	 was	 also	
asked	 to	 focus	 on	 efforts	 to	 eradicate	
corruption	 involving	 law	 enforcement	
officials,	 state	 administrators	 and	 other	
relevant	 actors.	 The	 KPK	 was	 also	
assigned	 to	 chase	 corruption	 cases	 that	
received	 widespread	 attention	 and	
disturbed	 the	 public	 and	 inflicted	 state	
losses	of	at	least	Rp.1	Billion	(Law	No.	30	
of	2002).	
To	 implement	 these	 tasks,	 the	
KPK	 had	 been	 given	 considerable	
authorities	 to	 crack	 down	 (Peran	
Penindakan	 KPK,	 Role	 of	 Enforcement)	
on	 the	 corrupt	 officials,	 namely:	 (i)	
Taking	over	investigations/prosecutions	
that	were	being	conducted	by	the	Police	
/	 Prosecutors	 Office;	 (ii)	 Tapping	 into	
and	 recording	 conversations;	 (iii)	
Ordering	 relevant	 agencies	 to	 prohibit	
someone	 from	 traveling	 abroad;	 (iv)	
Instructing	 banks	 or	 financial	
institutions	to	freeze	accounts	suspected	
of	 having	 been	 the	 result	 of	 corruption	
belonging	 to	 a	 suspect,	 defendant	 or	
other	 related	 parties;	 (v)	 Ordering	 the	
leaders	 or	 superiors	 of	 suspects	 to	
temporarily	dismiss	suspects	 from	their	
positions;	 and	 (vi)	 Temporarily	
terminate	 a	 financial	 transaction,	 trade	
transaction	 and	 other	 agreements	 (Act	
No.	30	of	2002).	
Not	only	in	terms	of	prosecution,	
but	 the	 KPK	 also	 had	 the	 authority	 to	
prevent	 corruption	 (Peran	 Pencegahan	
KPK,	 Prevention	 Role)	 through	 the	
authority	 to	 receive	 registration	 and	
examination	 of	 State	 Officials’	 Assets	
(Laporan	Harta	Kekayaan	Penyelenggara	
Negara,	 LHKPN),	 receive	 reports	 and	
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determine	 gratification	 status,	 conduct	
anti-corruption	 education,	 conduct	
socialization	 and	 campaigns	 fighting	
corruption,	 and	 do	 bilateral	 or	
multilateral	cooperation.	When	it	comes	
to	 monitoring	 government	
administration,	 the	 KPK	 had	 the	
authority	 to	 conduct	 an	 assessment	 of	
the	 administrative	 management	 system	
in	all	state	and	government	institutions,	
advising	 the	 leadership	 of	 state	 and	
government	 institutions	 to	 make	




of	 the	 KPK,	 this	 commission	 was	 also	
given	 the	 authority	 to	 coordinate	




eradication	 activities	 from	 the	 relevant	
agencies,	 conduct	 hearings	 or	 meetings	
with	 related	 agencies	 regarding	 the	
prevention	 of	 corruption.	 Whereas	 in	
terms	 of	 supervision,	 the	 KPK	 had	 the	
authority	 to	 conduct	 surveillance,	
research	 on	 agencies	 that	 fight	 against	
corruption	 and	 agencies	 that	 provide	









presidents	 have	 led	 the	 island	 nation,	
they	 are:	 Burhanuddin	 Jusuf	 Habibie,	
Abdurrahman	Wahid	(also	known	as	Gus	
Dur),	Megawati	 Sukarnoputri	 (daughter	
of	 Indonesia’s	 first	 president,	 Sukarno),	
Susilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono	(often	called	
SBY)),	 and	 finally	 Joko	 Widodo	 (also	
known	as	Jokowi).	Unlike	in	the	Soeharto	
New	 Order	 era	 which	 placed	 the	
President	as	the	sole	actor	in	Indonesian	
politics,	 in	 the	 Reformation	 era,	 other	
actors	had	to	be	taken	into	account	in	the	
Indonesian	 political	 landscape,	 namely:	
Parliament	and	the	general	public.	Even	
though	 technically	 Indonesia	 is	 more	
democratic,	actually	Indonesia's	political	
landscape	 is	 very	 complex	 and	 diverse	
because	most	political	elites	want	to	play	
in	the	new	Indonesian	political	arena.	
During	 the	 Habibie	 period,	
Indonesia	 made	 many	 breakthroughs	
towards	 a	 democratic	 country.	 Some	 of	
the	 steps	 he	 took	 include:	 changing	
regulations	and	electoral	systems	so	that	
they	 did	 not	 produce	 authoritarian	
political	 elites,	 encouraging	 the	 birth	 of	
participatory	 civil	 society,	
professionalizing	the	army,	and	ensuring	
press	 freedom	 (O’Rourke	 2002;	 Crouch	
2010).	 Even	 so,	 the	 Habibie	
administration	 was	 tainted	 by	 the	
allegation	 of	 corruption	 by	 the	
presidential	 campaign	 team	 related	 to	
Bank	 of	 Indonesia	 Liquidity	 Assistance	
(Bantuan	 Likuiditas	 Bank	 Indonesia,	
BLBI)	 for	 Bank	 of	 Bali	 (Juwono	 2016:	
197).	 Also,	 his	 administration	 was	
considered	problematic	because	Habibie	







not	 appear	 to	 have	 progressed	 despite	
the	 formation	 of	 the	 Joint	 Team	 for	









Corruption	 Eradication	 (Tim	 Gabungan	
Pemberantasan	 Tindak	 Pidana	 Korupsi,	
TGPTPK).	 Unfortunately,	 TGPTPK	 could	
not	 run	 optimally	 due	 to	 strong	
opposition	 from	 various	 parties,	
especially	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
(Mahkamah	 Agung,	 MA).	 In	 the	 end,	
TGPTPK	was	interrupted	by	division	and	
vacancy	 of	 leadership,	 then	 it	 was	
dissolved	 after	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
approved	 the	 application	 for	 a	 judicial	
review	 that	 cancelled	 the	 TGPTPK	








elected	 (including	 regional	 heads	
(governors,	 regents,	 and	 mayors)),	 the	
formation	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	
(Mahkamah	 Konstitusi,	 MK),	 and	 most	
importantly	 the	 formation	 of	 the	
Corruption	 Eradication	 Commission	
(KPK).	
The	 first	 period	 of	 SBY	
administration	 (2004-2009)	 was	
considered	 quite	 successful	 because	 it	
succeeded	in	reforming	the	bureaucracy,	
such	 as	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 and	 several	
others	(Juwono	2016).	Besides,	SBY	also	
managed	 to	 stem	 the	 influence	 of	
oligarchs	 in	 economic	 policy,	 especially	
those	 relating	 to	 policies	 that	 favored	
their	business	unfairly.	This	can	be	seen	
from	 the	 many	 interests	 of	 politicians-
entrepreneurs	(such	as	 Jusuf	Kalla	(vice	
president	 in	 SBY’s	 first	 term	 (2004-
2009)	 and	 Jokowi’s	 (2014-2019),	
Aburizal	 Bakrie	 (General	 Chair	 of	 the	
Functional	 Group	 Party	 of	 2009-2014;	
former	 Coordinating	 Minister	 for	 the	
Economy	 in	 2004-2005;	 former	




succeeded	 in	 establishing	 itself	 as	 a	
stable	institution.	Not	only	that,	the	KPK	
-led	 by	 Taufiqurrahman	 Ruki	 -	 also	
succeeded	in	increasing	its	reputation	as	
an	 independent	 corruption	 eradication	
institution	 in	 Indonesia	 by	 prosecuting	
former	Megawati’s	 ministers	 who	were	
charged	 with	 corruption,	 and	 handling	
corruption	cases	in	the	General	Election	
Commission	 (Komisi	 Pemilihan	 Umum,	
KPU),	 including	ensnaring	 the	chairman	
and	 other	 KPU	 top	 leaders.	 The	 next	
succeeding	chair	of	KPK,	Antasari	Azhar,	
lead	 this	 anti-corruption	 agency	 even	
more	 aggressively	 in	 carrying	 out	
corruption	 eradication	 operations,	
including	 those	 involving	 former	
Governor	 of	 Bank	 Indonesia	 (BI)	
(Burhanuddin	Abdullah)	 former	Deputy	
Governor	 of	 BI	 (Aulia	 Pohan	 (President	
SBY’s	in-law)),	and	former	Chief	of	Police	
of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 (General	
Rusdiharjo).	With	 all	 of	 these	 activities,	
the	 KPK	 began	 to	 face	 significant	
counterattacks,	with	one	major	 incident	
was	 the	 arrest	 of	 two	 of	 their	
commissioners	(Bibit	Samad	Riyanto	and	
Chandra	Hamzah)	who	almost	paralyzed	
the	 KPK.	 This	 shows	 that	 since	 its	
inception,	 the	 Corruption	 Eradication	
Commission	 has	 been	 exposed	 and	
attacked	 by	 corrupt	 elites	 or	 people	 to	
weaken	this	anti-corruption	institution.	
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In	 his	 second	 term	 (2009-2014),	
SBY	 appeared	 to	 be	 more	 moderate	
because	 he	 was	 too	 careful	 in	
“maintaining	 political	 stability”	 by	
securing	supports	from	the	House	and	its	
political	 coalition	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
substantial-good	 governance	 reforms	
(McBeth	 2016).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 pace	 of	
governance	 reforms	 was	 not	 as	
progressive	 as	 in	 his	 first	 term.	 This	 is	
affecting	 directly	 the	 eradication	 of	
corruption	agenda.	This	was	seen	when	
SBY	 was	 reluctant	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	
lengthy	 conflict	 between	 the	 police	 and	
the	KPK	commissioners.	Although	in	the	
end,	 due	 to	 public	 pressure,	 SBY	 took	
popular	measures	to	end	the	friction	by	
supporting	 the	 KPK.	 Despite	 pressure	
from	 the	 police	 and	 SBY’s	 neglect,	 the	
KPK	 under	 Abraham	 Samad	 leadership	




of	 SBY,	 such	 as	 Minister	 of	 Youth	 and	
Sports	 (Andi	 Mallarangeng,	 elite	
Democratic	 Party),	 Minister	 of	 Energy	
and	 Mineral	 Resources	 (Jero	 Wacik,	
Democratic	 Party	 elite),	 Anas	
Urbaningrum	 (Democratic	 Party	
Chairperson),	 and	 others	 (Agustino	 and	
Fitriani	2017).	Since	these	cases	affected	
the	 SBY’s	 last	 term,	 the	 results	 of	 the	
2014	General	Election,	unfortunately,	hit	
the	Democratic	Party	hard.	
Jokowi	 succeeded	 SBY	 in	 2014,	
but	the	KPK	was	no	better.	First,	Jokowi’s	
decision	 to	 promote	 the	 Police	





2019-2023	 let	 down	 anti-corruption	
activists	 (including	 the	 Indonesian	
Corruption	 Watch	 (ICW)).	 concerned	
activists	believed	 that	Firli	 had	violated	
ethics	 because	 he	 met	 with	 a	 litigant,	
namely	Tuanku	Guru	Bajang	as	a	witness	
in	 the	 Newmont	 divestment	
investigation	 (cnnindonesia.com,	 2020).	
Second,	 Jokowi	 was	 perceived	 as	
breaking	 his	 promise	 by	 approving	 the	
revision	 of	 the	 KPK	 Law	 which	 was	







Undang-undang,	 Perppu)	 of	 the	 KPK	 to	
address	 the	 anti-corruption	 activists’	
concerns	over	the	weakening	of	the	KPK.	
And	 thirdly,	 President	 Jokowi	 is	
considered	 to	 be	 unwilling	 to	 firmly	
settle	the	acid	attack	case	against	one	of	
KPK's	 experienced	 senior	 investigators,	
Novel	 Baswedan	 -	 who	 succeeded	 in	
uncovering	 major	 corruption	 cases	 in	
Indonesia.	The	Baswedan	case	has	never	
been	 completed	 even	 though	 the	





An	 important	 question	 to	 ask	 is	
whether	 the	 corruption	 felons	 do	 not	
fight	 back	 (those	 who	 have	 not	 been	
caught)	or	retaliate	(for	those	who	have	
been	arrested)	against	the	KPK?	It	is	not	
an	 easy	 question	 to	 answer.	 However,	
based	on	past	events,	we	can	infer	that	as	
long	 as	 the	 KPK	 exists,	 there	 would	 be	









always	 challenges	 and	 obstacles	 in	 our	
collective	corruption	eradication	efforts.	
Several	 cases	 demonstrate	 that	
the	challenges	and	obstacles	blocking	the	
KPK	 in	 enforcing	 anti-corruption	 laws.	
First	 (and	 always	 occurred	 in	 every	
leadership	 regime)	 weakening	 mode	 is	
by	means	of	attempted	arrests	of	the	KPK	
top	 leaders	 (known	 as	 commissioners)	
when	 they	 are	 dealing	 with	 major	
corruption	 cases.	 The	 first	 arrest	 of	 the	
KPK	 leader	 occurred	 when	 the	 Police	
Commissioner	 General	 Susno	 Duadji	
(Head	of	the	Indonesian	National	Police’s	
Criminal	 Investigation	 Agency	 (Kepala	
Badan	 Reserse	 Kriminal	 Kepolisian	
Republik	 Indonesia	 (Kabareskrim))	
arrested	 Antasari	 Azhar	 (Chair	 of	 the	
KPK	 second	 period)	 Antasari	 was	
charged	 with	 murdering	 Nasrudin	






Traffic	 Corps	 (Kepala	 Korps	 Lalu	 Lintas	
Kepolisian	(Kakorlantas))	as	a	suspect	in	
the	procurement	of	a	steering	simulator	
worth	 Rp.782	 billion	 in	 2012.	 The	
weakening	of	the	KPK	motif	was	evident	
from	 the	 targeting	 of	 Novel	 Baswedan,	
the	 lead	 investigator	 of	 the	 simulator	
procurement	 case,	 which	 was	 hunted	
down	to	the	KPK	office	in	October	2012	-	
a	few	days	after	the	arrest	of	Djoko	Susilo	
(Tempo	 23-29	 December	 2013).	 The	




in	 the	Bengkulu	 regional	police	 in	2004	
(Tempo	7-13	March	2016).	
The	most	 recent	 case	of	 the	KPK	
leader’s	attempted	arrest	occurred	when	
Abraham	 Samad	 and	 Bambang	
Widjojanto	 were	 criminalized	 after	 the	
appointment	of	the	Police	Commissioner	
General	 Budi	 Gunawan	 (former	 Deputy	
Chief	 of	 Police	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	
Indonesia	and	currently	head	of	the	State	
Intelligence	 Agency	 (Badan	 Intelijen	
Negara,	 BIN))	 as	 a	 bribery	 and	
gratification	 suspect	 in	 mid-January	
2015.	 Fortunately,	 the	 tension	 between	
two	 law-enforcer	 institutions	 became	
somewhat	 eased	 after	 the	 appointment	
of	 General	 Tito	 Karnavian	 (then	 as	 the	
Chief	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 National	 Police	
(Kepala	 Polisi	 Republik	 Indonesia,	
Kapolri)	and	now	as	the	Minister	of	Home	
Affairs)	 managed	 to	 “bridge”	 good	
communication	 between	 these	 two	
institutions.	 In	 the	 end,	 Budi	 Gunawan	
case	subsided	and	was	abandoned.	
The	second	weakening	mode	is	an	
ever-growing	 popular	 proposal	 among	
lawmakers	 that	 pushes	 the	 KPK	 to	 be	
made	 an	 ad-hoc	 institution.	 It	 implies	
that	the	KPK	can	be	dissolved	at	any	time.	
The	 term	 ad-hoc	 institution	 always	
surfaces	 especially	 after	 the	 KPK	 has	
been	able	to	prove	itself	as	an	institution	
to	 eradicate	 corruption	 that	 is	 different	
from	 the	 Prosecutors’	 Office	 and	 the	
Police.	 The	 difference	 is	 based	 on	 the	
performance	 of	 the	 KPK	 which	 has	
always	been	able	 to	uncover	corruption	
scandals	in	the	circle	of	state	institutions	
such	 as	 the	 House,	 high-rank	 state	
officials	 (both	 at	 central	 and	 regional	
levels:	 ministers,	 governors,	 regents,	
mayors,	directors	and	commissioners	of	
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state-owned	 enterprises),	 the	 judiciary,	
and	 other	 law	 enforcers.	 The	 results	 of	
KPK’s	 top	 performance	 encourages	
corrupt-minded	 officials	 -	 who	 are	 in	
state	 institutions	 -	 to	 always	 push	 this	




up.	 The	 reason	 was	 that	 the	 anti-
corruption	 institution	 is	 considered	
under-performed	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	
corruption	 eradication	 agenda.	 It	 was	
perceived	 that	 the	 KPK	 in	 was	 only	




the	 KPK	 (as	 an	 ad-hoc	 institution)	
reappeared	 in	 August	 2015,	 at	 the	
Constitutional	Seminar	at	the	Parliament	
Building	when	Megawati	said	that	ad-hoc	
institutions	 could	 be	 dissolved	 because	
of	 their	 temporary	 design,	 including	
(Nasional	Tempo,	2020).			
Third,	 legislation	 was	 also	
targeted	by	 those	who	benefited	 from	a	
weak	anti-corruption	agency.	To	achieve	
this,	 they	 proposed	 to	 revise	 Law	
Number	30	of	2002	about	the	Corruption	
Eradication	 Commission	 and	 change	 it	
into	Law	Number	19	of	2019	about	 the	
Second	Amendment	 to	 Law	Number	 30	
of	2002	about	the	Corruption	Eradication	
Commission.	 Some	 observers	 said	 that	
the	 new	 Corruption	 Eradication	
Commission	Law	reduces	the	KPK’s	role	
and	power.		This	is	because	the	KPK	has	





limit	 the	 recruitment	 of	 independent	
investigators	 so	 that	 all	 investigators	
must	be	from	the	police	(which	may	be	an	
easy	 mode	 for	 senior	 police	 officers	 to	
control	the	investigators);	The	last	thing	
they	 seek	 to	 accomplish	 through	
legislation	 is	 to	 make	 the	 wiretapping	
illegal	 unless	 permitted	 by	 the	
Supervisory	 Board	 (a	 new	 structure	
within	the	KPK	that	determines	the	steps	
and	movements	of	the	new	KPK).	
In	 addition,	 those	 orchestrated	
attempts,	the	House	of	Representative	is	
also	 trying	 to	weaken	 the	 KPK	 through	
the	revision	of	the	Book	of	Criminal	Code	
(Kitab	 Undang-undang	 Hukum	 Pidana,	
KUHP)	by	 including	corruption	offenses	
into	the	draft	(at	the	time	of	this	writing	
was	 completed,	 March	 2020,	 the	 draft	
was	 not	 passed	 yet).	 If	 this	 proposal	 is	
passed,	then	corruption	will	no	longer	be	
considered	 as	 an	 extra-ordinary	 crime,	
but	merely	an	ordinary	crime.	In	fact,	in	




conspiracy	 of	 corruption.	 And	 some	 of	
the	things	mentioned	above	are	different	
from	 the	 corruption	 eradication	 laws	
that	 were	 previously	 in	 force.	 This	
weakening	 through	 legislation	 will	
certainly	 hamper	 KPK's	 efforts	 to	
eradicate	 corruption	 in	 Indonesia	 -	 as	
like	the	dream	of	the	general	public	at	the	
beginning	of	 the	Reformation	Era	about	
Indonesia	 free	 of	 corruption,	 collusion,	




The	 presence	 of	 the	 KPK	 is	 an	
important	 milestone	 in	 Indonesia's	









political	 and	 public	 administration	
landscape.	 Compared	 to	 the	 failures	 of	
various	corruption	eradication	initiatives	
in	the	previous	era,	the	KPK	succeeded	in	
setting	 new	 standards	 in	 eradicating	
corruption	 by	 shaking	 the	 impunity	 of	
high	 officials	 and	 acting	 on	 it,	 such	 as	
their	ability	to	crack	down	on	ministers,	
governors,	 regents	 and	 mayors,	
members	of	parliament	at	the	central	and	
regional	levels,	police	officers,	and	more.	
Despite	 its	 success,	 the	 KPK	 is	 still	
vulnerable	 to	counterattacks	by	corrupt	
officials	 and	 groups	 with	 malicious	
intent.	
If	 the	 various	 attempts	 at	
weakening	 and	 dissolution	 of	 the	 KPK	
succeed,	then	the	one	who	cheers	(gains)	
is	 certainly	 the	 corrupt	 elites	 and	 those	




that	 has	 been	 fostered	 since	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 Reformation.	 This	 is	 a	
major	 concern	 for	 civil	 society	 today.	
Under	 these	 conditions,	 responsible	
political	commitment	and	goodwill	of	the	













top	 leaderships	 and	 average	 personnel	
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